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In a 1994 essay, Jack Halberstam famously declared that “We are all transsexu-
als . . . and there are no transsexuals.” 1 Transsexual (“Trans”) people might make the 
shakiness of gender particularly visible, but gender uncertainty is visited upon us all. 
Gender is not so much a status but a lifelong project for everyone—living up to it, 
convincing others that we are doing it right, rejecting it, changing it, fixing it. We 
need, Halberstam said, “to rewrite the cultural fiction that divides sex from a transex, 
a gender from a transgender.”2 That statement was enunciated around the time that 
“transsexual” (soon to be absorbed by “transgender”) appeared as a tiny figure on 
the horizon of mainstream political legibility and captured a tension that has hovered 
over the transgender rights movement ever since. Are we referring to transgender as 
a particular type of person, collectively only a tiny proportion of the population, des-
perately in need of rights and respect? Or are we talking about the rights of everyone 
to live in and express their gender as they see fit? Who are transgender rights for? 
Who needs transgender rights? 
Halberstam’s statement reflected the intellectual ferment that surrounded queer 
theory in the 1990s. Eve Sedgewick’s Epistemology of the Closet, Judith Butler’s Gender 
Trouble, and Michael Warner’s Fear of a Queer Planet collection, among others, were 
received as celebrating fluidity over stasis, acts over identity, a queer anti-normative 
politics over the assimilationist tendencies of the gay and lesbian rights movement.3 
                                                          
 1. J. Halberstam, F2M: The Masking of Female Masculinity, in THE LESBIAN POSTMODERN 226 (Laura Doan ed., 
1994). 
 2. Id. 
 3. EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET (1990); JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 
(1990); JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER (1993); FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND 
1
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Queer theory wanted to free sexuality from heteronormativity, intimacy from mo-
nogamy, and sex from private property.4 Guided by poststructuralist theory and its 
critique of essentialism, a radical queer politics would supersede the identity politics 
then (and now) powering the gay and lesbian rights movement. 
One particular thread from the queer theoretical revolution turned out to mat-
ter a great deal in contemporary debates about transgender rights. Sedgwick had iden-
tified two different ways of thinking about the relation between homosexuality and 
heterosexuality in western culture. The “minoritizing view holds that there are a dis-
tinct number of people who ‘really are’ gay.” The second “universalizing” approach 
positions sexuality as “an issue of continuing, determinative importance in the lives 
of people across the spectrum of sexualities.”5 In The History of Sexuality, Michel Fou-
cault described the emergence of homosexual identity in the late nineteenth cen-
tury—“The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a 
species.”6 Homosexuality, defining a specific type of person, an identity, is minoritiz-
ing; sexuality understood as constituted by acts and desires is universalizing. Even as 
Foucault and those who followed him emphasized the historical contingency of the 
category of homosexuality (and heterosexuality), Sedgwick, writing in the late 1980s, 
was concerned that gay historians saw the identity-based model as “supervening” the 
act-based model. In fact, she stressed chapter after chapter, both notions co-existed 
throughout the twentieth century.7 
She need not have worried. The next generation of queer theorists (generation 
as in reproducing PhDs, not as in new human adults) largely dismissed gay and lesbian 
identity politics and instead turned their gazes toward the expansive approach. Queer 
readings of literature, television, and social policy—from Shakespeare 
(“Shakesqueer”) to “The Jack Benny Show” to the Personal Responsibility and Wel-
fare Reform Act of 1996—demonstrated how, even absent a discussion of homosex-
uality or a visible homosexual character, sexuality functions as “an especially dense 
transfer point for relations of power.”8 By the beginning of this century, the pendu-
lum had most definitely swung back to the universalizing side.9 
Halberstam’s statement transposes Sedgwick’s observation about the different 
constructions of homo/sexual definition onto the question of transgender/gender. 
But it does more than that. It also exports queer theory’s tendency to privilege the 
universalizing approach over the apparent limits of an identitarian approach. The 
                                                          
SOCIETY THEORY (Michael Warner ed., 1993). 
 4. Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner define heternormativity as “the institutions, structures of understanding, 
and practical orientations that make heterosexuality seem not only coherent-that is, organized as a sexuality-but also 
privileged.” Laura Berlant & Michael Warner, Sex in Public, 24 CRITICAL INQUIRY 547, 548 (1998). 
 5. SEDGWICK, supra note 3, at 1. 
 6. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: VOLUME I 43, (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books 
1990). 
 7. SEDGWICK, supra note 3, at 47. 
 8. FOUCAULT, supra note 6, at 103. 
 9. See, e.g., SHAKESQUEER: A QUEER COMPANION TO THE COMPLETE WORKS OF SHAKESPEARE (Madhavi 
Menon ed., 2011); ALEX DOTY, MAKING THINGS PERFECTLY QUEER: INTERPRETING MASS CULTURE (1993); 
EDELMAN LEE, NO FUTURE: QUEER THEORY AND THE DEATH DRIVE (2004); ANNA MARIE SMITH, WELFARE 
REFORM AND SEXUAL REGULATION (2007). 
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conflict between queer theory and LGB advocacy has never been resolved, though 
one could say there has been an armistice. LGB advocates have largely ceded the 
humanistic academic terrain to queer studies, and instead rely on social scientists to 
produce evidence supporting identity-based LGB rights claims—for example, that 
same-sex parents don not harm children, that same-sex marriage will not bring an 
end to the institution of marriage. Similarly, beyond a few manifestos, queer theorists 
have largely given up on the possibility of making universalizing arguments intelligible 
to policymakers and judges because those positions do not usually reflect settled com-
mon sense and do require conceptual sophistication to apprehend them.10 
Unlike the LBG/sexuality question, however, the transgender/gender debate 
has not been shunted off to the sidelines and limited to humanistic academic inquiry. 
The question is of crucial importance to anyone who has had their gender censured 
by an employer, a school, a court, a social service agency, or the police. Most people 
have experienced this policing at some time and to some degree: a high school boy 
who is told his shirt is “too gay,” a woman chastised for wearing business attire that 
is not feminine enough, a transgender woman barred from the women’s bathroom 
because of the sex she was assigned at birth. People in the transgender rights move-
ment—from impact litigation attorneys framing equality arguments, to advocates 
working quietly with officials on administrative policies, to local activists pushing 
non-discrimination bills in their city or state—think long and hard about the kinds of 
people and conduct that will benefit from the particular change they are trying to 
bring about. 
In the area of transgender rights, disagreements over whether to follow a par-
ticular or a universal approach have often quickly turned into disagreements about 
what gender really is.11 Is gender identity fixed, or might it change more than once 
throughout the life course? Are transsexual people born in the wrong body, or is the 
wrong body narrative imposed by a medical establishment and legal architecture in-
tent on maintaining the rigid border between male and female, even as they develop 
diagnoses and criteria that would allow one to move morphologically and/or legally 
from one gender to another? Is gender identity expressed through one’s clothes, voice, 
demeanor, or is it retroactively inscribed on a person through performing it? Is gen-
der a property of the brain or an effect of the social, of the psyche, of discourse, of 
language? 
Painting with a broad brush, these contests over gender pit the medical and 
psychiatric establishment against the third wave feminist theory, which denaturalized 
gender. That both positions circulate inside the transgender rights movement reflects 
the protean nature of “transgender.” It stands for “any and all kinds of variation from 
gender norms and expectations,”12 and for people who have a gender identity not 
                                                          
 10. One notable exception is the historian’s brief to the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas, which pointed out 
that laws against sodomy were part of the regulation of what we now call heterosexuality. See Brief of Professors of 
History George Chauncey et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2002) 
(No. 02-102) (2003 WL 152350). 
 11. Here I am not addressing the arguments of opponents of transgender rights, who attempt to make what they 
imagine biological sex to be the arbiter of one’s classification as male or female.  
 12. SUSAN STRYKER, TRANSGENDER HISTORY 19 (2008). 
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traditionally associated with the sex assigned at birth—that is, for a particular type of 
person. By this point, it is pretty much axiomatic that the minoritizing approach re-
flects gender essentialism while the universalizing way of understanding gender 
norms and deviations from them is constructionist. But what if we separate, at least 
provisionally, the question of “Who needs trans rights?” from the question of “What 
is gender?” That this seems deeply counterintuitive (even to me) reveals the hold that 
the essentialism-constructionism debate of the 1990s still has on the limits of our 
political imagination. It so deeply structures our thinking that distinguishing questions 
about trans politics from questions about trans identity/subjectivity seems just 
wrong. (Of course, that association is not limited to the present topic. In political 
theory, in my field, undergraduates learn on day one that a thinker’s conception of 
justice is deeply bound up with their views about human nature.) 
In this thought experiment, however, instead of doing the usual thing and col-
lapsing the minoritizing-universalizing problematic into a disagreement about gender, 
I am going to disaggregate these questions and focus only on the former. Reviewing 
these two books provides a perfect opportunity to do so. Identity politics thoroughly 
suffuses the approach taken by the contributors to Jami K. Taylor and Donald P. 
Haider-Markel’s edited collection, Transgender Rights and Politics: Groups, Issue Framing, 
& Policy Adoption. Conversely, Kimberly A. Yuracko’s monograph, Gender Nonconform-
ity and the Law, spells out the tension and ultimately argues in favor of the universalist 
approach. 
The lodestar for Yuracko’s argument, which focusses solely on workplace non-
discrimination law, is the case of Darlene Jespersen. Jespersen had worked as a bar-
tender at Harrah’s Casino in Reno, Nevada, for twenty years before her employer 
started enforcing a “Beverage Department Image Transformation” policy which 
mandated its female employees wear “[m]ake up (face powder, blush and mas-
cara) . . . applied neatly in complimentary colors” along with lip color and femininely 
styled hair.13 Male employees, however, would be in violation of the policy if they did 
wear make-up or style their hair. Jespersen refused and was fired. She argued that the 
policy “forced her to be feminine” and to become “dolled up” like a sexual object,’” 
and ultimately “interfered with her ability to do her job.”14 Because only women were 
forced to wear make-up and style their hair, Jespersen’s Title VII claim asserted that 
Harrah’s policy amounted to disparate treatment based on sex. She lost in district 
court, again in the Ninth Circuit, and finally in a 2006 Ninth Circuit en banc decision. 
While Title VII generally prohibits sex stereotyping, the first Ninth Circuit panel held 
that the existence of different grooming standards for men and women did not con-
stitute sex stereotyping. The en banc decision was even more counter-intuitive: alt-
hough sex-based appearance standards violate Title VII, there was no evidence to 
suggest that the policy “was adopted to make women bartenders conform to a com-
monly-accepted stereotypical image of what women should wear.”15 
Yuracko contrasts these dress code and grooming cases with two other types 
                                                          
 13. As cited in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 14. KIMBERLY A. YURACKO, GENDER NONCONFORMITY AND THE LAW 24 (2016). 
 15. Id. at 23. 
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of cases involving gender nonconforming people: those of transgender people tran-
sitioning in the workplace and those of individuals (generally men) harassed because 
they are seen as too feminine or because they are perceived as gay. In the last decade, 
the latter two types of sex discrimination claims have been increasingly successful.16 
As Jennifer Levi, a law professor and director of the Transgender Rights Project at 
GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders who has written widely on this issue and also 
litigated it, observed out in 2008, the “pervasive attitude of judicial laissez-faire to-
ward sex-based dress codes is increasingly anomalous in the wider context of sex 
discrimination case law, yet it shows no signs of abating.”17 The central question that 
runs through Yuracko’s book is this: “Why are transsexuals winning their challenges 
to sex-based gender conformity demands while garden-variety gender benders are 
not?”18 Yuracko thinks it through chapter by chapter as she examines different doc-
trines on sex discrimination law: formal gender neutrality which suggests that dispar-
ate treatment of any sort is untenable; anti-subordination doctrine, which suggests 
that courts should consider the history of a particular group, in this case women, in 
adjudicating sex discrimination cases when the action in question has a disparate im-
pact; doctrines differentiating status from conduct; approaches that depend on free-
dom of expression. The penultimate chapter compares the expansions of protection 
based on gender identity and the lack of such protection for expressions of racial 
identity. 
After careful and nuanced readings detailing how these doctrines fare in the 
case law, Yuracko concludes that no particular doctrinal approach can explain the 
growing gap between cases litigated based on gender identity and those involving 
only nonconforming gender expression. Instead, she argues, “it has resulted from a 
set of values, commitments, and beliefs that are significantly more controversial. In 
particular, recent protection for transsexuals . . . has flowed most directly from a re-
inforced and newly medicalized commitment to binary gender categories.”19 What 
accounts for the success of the gender identity cases, then, is the emphasis on status, 
on immutability, and on the medical establishment’s verification of gender through 
                                                          
 16. The EEOC has ruled in two cases, Macy v. Holder, EEOC DOC 0120120821 (Apr. 20, 2012) (2012 WL 
1435995), and Lusardi v. McHugh, EEOC DOC 0120133395, (April 1, 2015) (2015 WL 1607756) that discrimination 
against transgender people constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. Both cases involved women transitioning in the workplace. See also U.S. EEOC, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW 
ABOUT EEOC AND THE ENFORCEMENT PROTECTIONS FOR LGBT WORKERS, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/news-
room/wysk/enforcement_protections_lgbt_workers.cfm.  
 17. Jennifer L. Levi, Missapplying Equality Theories: Dress Codes at Work, 19 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 353, 389 (2008).  
 18. YURACKO, supra note 14, at 2. Yuracko is not the first to address this issue. One major failing of the book is 
that Yuracko does not address the key scholarship on her question. For example, Jennifer Levi has written much 
about sex-differentiated grooming policies in general, and the Jespersen case in particular. Yet only some of Levi’s 
work is listed in endnotes, and Yuracko does not address Levi’s ideas about the relationship between the successful 
discrimination claims based on transgender identity and the lack of movement in jurisprudence on grooming stand-
ards and dress codes. See, e.g., Levi, supra note 17, at 354-390; Jennifer L. Levi, Clothes Don’t Make the Man (or Woman) 
But Gender Identity Might, 15 COLUM J. GENDER & L. 90, 90–113 (2006). Indeed, Yuracko’s general citational practice 
seems to be to name check well known individuals not particularly associated with transgender scholarship and ad-
vocacy (e.g., Mary Anne Case, Andrew Koppelman, Martha Nussbaum) in the text, and generally relegate those work-
ing in the area of discrimination against transgender and gender nonconforming people to the footnotes (Levi) or 
not include them at all (Jillian Weiss). 
 19. YURACKO, supra note 14, at 172. 
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science. These dress code and grooming cases reinforce the gender binary, Yuracko 
suggests, and thus “come at the expense of greater rigidity of gender roles and expec-
tations for all workers.”20 In her view, the minoritizing “transsexual” cases impair the 
possibility of the universalizing “garden-variety gender benders,” like Darlene Jesper-
sen, to be protected against sex stereotyping in the workplace. 
Yuracko’s analysis of these doctrines and their use, and misuse, in these two 
strands of stereotyping law is thorough and penetrating. But she fails to make the 
case that the successful “transsexual” employment litigation is responsible for the 
lack of progress for “garden variety gender benders”—she just assumes it must be 
so. And that assumption is made possible by her conceptual apparatus. The terms 
“transsexual” and “garden-variety gender benders” are repeated throughout the 
book. Her use of them comes off as somewhat out of touch with the communities 
she is writing about or the scholarship that dispels the stereotypes about transgender 
people.21 “Transsexual” carries the whiff of the pathologizing discourses from 
whence it emerged, and has largely been replaced by “transgender” by advocates and 
plaintiffs in these cases—increasingly even judges. It is also much more common 
now for both terms to be used as adjectives, (e.g. transsexual woman, transgender 
people) rather than as nouns, which reduces a person to a single characteristic. But it 
is not just a matter of politically incorrect language. The real problem with this usage 
is more fundamental. Basing the crux of her analysis on a distinction between “gar-
den-variety gender benders” and “transsexuals” reinforces the idea that there is some-
thing particularly strange or exotic about people who transition.22 The organizing 
binary of Yuracko’s book effectively re-naturalizes cissexual normativity as universal 
(garden-variety), relegates transsexuality to an exotic identity politics position, and 
imagines that it is the latter that trucks in gender essentialism.23 
There is another explanation for first part of the central question that Yuracko 
poses in her book—Why are courts deciding that transgender people cannot be 
forced wear the clothes traditionally associated with the sex assigned to them at birth? 
Perhaps it is simply because the transgender women in these cases are women, the 
transgender men are men, and judges are increasingly recognizing this. Forcing a 
transgender woman to wear men’s clothes in the workplace constitutes a type of sex 
discrimination against an individual. There is no especial transsexual politics of gen-
der in these cases. Just as transgender people are not necessarily the harbingers of 
                                                          
 20. YURACKO, supra note 14, at 174. 
 21. See, e.g., A. Finn Enke, The Education of Little Cis: Cisgender and the Disciplining of Opposite Bodies, in 
TRANSFEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 60–77 (Anne Enke ed., 2012); Susan Stryker, Transgender Studies: Queer Theory’s Evil 
Twin, 10 GLQ: A J. OF LESBIAN AND GAY STUD. 212, 212–15 (2004); JOANNE MEYEROWTIZ, HOW SEX CHANGED: 
A HISTORY OF TRANSSEXUAITY IN THE UNITED STATES (2004); Cristan Williams, Transgender, 1 TSQ: 
TRANSGENDER STUD. Q. 232, 232–34 (2014). 
 22. The opposition also implies that “transsexuals” cannot be gender non-conformers in their own right. In fact, 
it’s entirely possible that people whose gender identity is not associated with the sex assigned to them at birth do not 
follow gender stereotypes, even post-transition. 
 23. Cissexual refers to individuals who are not transsexual. See JULIA SERANO, WHIPPING GIRL: A 
TRANSSEXUAL WOMAN ON SEXISM AND THE SCAPEGOATING OF FEMININITY 12 (2007). 
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gender revolution, they are not necessarily the select guardians of the traditional gen-
der regime.24 They just are—like everyone else. Their gender identity is no more or 
no less fixed than that of their cis doppelgangers. (“We are all transsexuals . . . there 
are no transsexuals.”25) The expert testimony presented to judges in these case does 
not, as Yuracko suggests, “newly medicalize” gender—gender has been medicalized 
in one way or another since the start of the scientific revolution in early modern 
Europe, and that medicalization has not been limited to, or even until recently di-
rected at, the transsexual body.26 To make the gender of transgender men and women 
legible to judges, advocates present the most recent version of gender’s medicaliza-
tion in the hope that this evidence will resonate with what judges already know about 
gender. On the matter of policies that require men and women to conform to gender 
norms in the workplace, these cases are neither here nor there. That this explanation 
is not the first to come to mind may be an effect of the belief that trans people’s 
equality claims are always really about litigating the meaning of gender and resolving 
the essentialist-constructionist debate. 
As to second part of the question—why courts continue to find these sex-dif-
ferentiated dress and grooming policies are not violations of Title VII—Yuracko pro-
vides the answer that many others have: norms and values.27 For employers and 
judges, hegemonic gender norms appear as common sense and as such are not all 
that pervious to rational doctrinal analysis. As a result, courts come up with contorted 
readings of neutrality and anti-subordination doctrines to keep the deep-seated gen-
der norms in place, as in the decisions in the Jespersen case. Changing the norms will 
require much more than simply making the right doctrinal arguments. 
One would be hard pressed to find a better representative of the minoritizing 
approach to trans politics than Taylor and Haider-Merkel’s collection.28 The contrib-
utors unabashedly occupy that end of the political spectrum. It is significant that, 
other than two pages in the introduction subtitled “The Concept of Transgender”—
in which the editors politely note that “different academic disciplines have different 
understandings of the term” and leave it at that29—there is not a speck of gender 
trouble in the entire collection. Here transgender rights are articulated simply as an 
identity politics, with little handwringing about the meaning of gender and its relation 
to transgender. Instead, the purpose of the collection is to add scholarship on the 
                                                          
 24. The widely held assumption in queer and trans studies that transgender rights claims should undermine gen-
der norms seems to be another import from queer theory. Robyn Wiegman and Elizabeth A. Wilson argue that 
normativity itself has become “queer’s axiomatic foe.” Robyn Wiegman & Elizabeth A. Wilson, Introduction: Antinor-
mativity’s Queer Conventions, 26 DIFFERENCES: A J. OF FEMINIST CULTURAL STUD. 1, 1-2 (2015); see also, Robyn Wieg-
man, Eve’s Triangles, or Queer Studies beside Itself, 26 DIFFERENCES: A J. OF FEMINIST CULTURAL STUD. 48, 48-73 (2015). 
 25. Judith Halberstam, F2M: The Masking of Female Masculinity, in THE LESBIAN POSTMODERN, 210, 225–26 
(Laura L Doan ed., 1994). 
 26. See, e.g., THOMAS LAQUEUR, MAKING SEX: BODY AND GENDER FROM THE GREEKS TO FREUD (1990). 
 27. Levi suggests that gender norms operate in the law as “collective hunches.” Jennifer L. Levi, Clothes Don’t 
Make the Man (or Woman) But Gender Identity Might, 15 COLUM. J. OF GENDER AND L. 90, 92–94 (2006). 
 28. TRANSGENDER POLITICS: GROUPS, ISSUE FRAMING, & POLICY ADOPTION (Jami K. Taylor & Donald P. 
Haider-Markel, eds., 2014). 
 29. Id. at 7. 
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transgender rights movement to the political science literature on new social move-
ments, issue framing, policy implementation, coalition and electoral politics. As the 
editors point out in their introduction, there has been a great deal of work on 
transgender rights outside of political science, but most of that has been from the 
perspectives of normative, queer, and deconstructive theory or doctrinally driven le-
gal studies.30 Within political science, transgender has generally been treated as an 
afterthought on LGBT empirical work of this kind. Transgender Rights and Politics pre-
sents an overall coherence generally lacking in edited collections. That is no doubt 
partly a result of all the collaborative work that went into created it: the editors and 
many of the contributors are co-authors of more than one chapter. 
These essays do much more than inventory the wins and losses of the move-
ment thus far. They also subject those political fortunes to the sort of granular foren-
sic analysis that only the tools of positivist social inquiry can deliver. Anthony J. 
Nownes uses the theory of density dependency to understand why the number of 
nationally active transgender rights groups grew from five in 1995 to nineteen in 2004 
and why it has since declined. In an exploration of state-level politics, Taylor and 
Daniel C. Lewis identify possible explanations for why there are twenty-one state 
nondiscrimination laws that prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in the work-
place but only seventeen of them include gender identity. Turning to city non-dis-
crimination ordinances, Taylor, Tadlock, Sarah J. Poggione and Brian DiSarro em-
ploy the quantitative method of event history analysis and the qualitative method of 
case study understand why some municipalities adopt transgender-inclusive non-dis-
crimination laws and why others do not. In another study of state nondiscrimination 
laws, Lewis, Taylor, DiSarro and Matthew J. Jacobsmeier find that there are differ-
ences between policy adoption based on sexual orientation and gender identity. In 
the current political climate, access to restrooms is one especially salient difference. 
Mitchell D. Sellers asks if partisanship plays a role in the decisions of governors to 
issue or rescind executive orders prohibiting discrimination based on gender identity. 
Based on research conducted in the United Kingdom, Ryan Combs compares the 
needs of transgender patients with the health services they are actually getting. In the 
collection’s final substantive article, “Birth Certificate Amendment Laws and Moral-
ity Politics,” Taylor, Tadlock and Poggione unpack an apparently counterintuitive 
fact: the states that do not have transgender-inclusive nondiscrimination laws in place 
are as likely as the presumably more liberal states that have such laws to allow 
transgender individuals to change the sex on their birth certificate. Their conclusion: 
While nondiscrimination laws involve majoritarian political contests, policymaking 
on birth certificates is much more likely to driven by federal professionalized bureau-
crats, who draw on expert knowledge and diffuse model policies vertically to state-
level bureaucrats. 
The only essay to address the assumed tension between identity politics and the 
universalizing approach is the contribution by Barry L. Tadlock, “Issue Framing and 
Transgender Politics.” He notes that the scholarly critique of transgender identity 
                                                          
 30. Id. at 5. 
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politics tends to devolve into a critique of rights-based politics in general. Moving 
from the theoretical to the empirical, Tadlock finds that the successful framing strat-
egies are the “vehicle” through which the rights-based strategy emerges.31 That is, it 
is the necessity of making the issues faced by gender nonconforming people intelli-
gible that requires these issues to be packaged in ways that will resonate to the public 
and policymakers, and the language of rights achieves this. Tadlock identifies the 
frames used in elite transgender advocacy as equality, education, safety/security, and 
empowerment; those used by groups opposed to transgender rights tend to message 
the issue as majoritarianism, freedom, safety/security, and pathology.32 Because pol-
icymakers and the public are less familiar with transgender issues, and because those 
issues are more complex (e.g., identity documents, access to facilities, in addition to 
discrimination) transgender advocacy needs more frames than is required by LGB 
advocacy. The latter focuses primarily on equality, and their opponents, which rely 
on morality frames. Similarly, in their study of the legal right to name changes in Latin 
America, Jacob R. Longaker and Heider-Markel find that transgender advocates use 
a number of frames, including a legal frame that speaks to the need for policy reform, 
a frame focused on discrimination that uses individuals’ stories, and the more abstract 
equality frame that uses the language of rights, justice, equality.33 
Adding to Tadlock’s cogent analysis, I suggest that the paramount frame is that 
of identity politics. It is the notion that transgender people constitute a group that 
makes it possible for so many different forms of gender nonconformity to be wran-
gled into a coherent political force. As I suggest in my book, the category brings 
together, at times uneasily, both ascribed and performative notions of identity/sub-
jectivity: people who understand themselves as having been born in the wrong body 
find themselves working alongside people who reject most gender norms as nothing 
but a mechanism of power and alongside people who identify as non-binary. A ca-
cophonous crowd, to be sure, yet one that is still imagined as moving forward to-
gether under the protective carapace of the transgender umbrella. Through identity 
politics, the transgender community is not just seen; it becomes visible against the 
backdrop of the civil rights tradition in the United States. Without the “transgender” 
nomenclature, the jumble of uneven advances in a wide variety of settings (different 
agencies, different branches of government, different jurisdictions) addressing very 
different legal areas (identity documents, discrimination, family law, incarceration, 
immigration, etc.) and involving different sorts of gender non-conformity (hewing to 
or rejecting the gender binary, for example) would not be hypostasized into a larger 
phenomenon. But with the term, these successes can be written into a new chapter 
                                                          
 31. Barry L. Tadlock, Issue Framing and Transgender Politics: An Examination of Interest Group Websites and Media Cov-
erage, in TRANSGENDER POLITICS: GROUPS, ISSUE FRAMING, & POLICY ADOPTION 25, 30 (Jami K. Taylor & Donald 
P. Haider-Markel, eds., 2014). 
 32. As an example of the majoritarian frame, Tadlock quotes the Massachusetts Family Institute’s pronounce-
ment that “our laws should not be changed to encourage a disorder at the expense of 99.05% of the population.” Id. 
at 33. 
 33. Jacob R. Longaker & Donald P. Haider-Markel, Transgender Policy in Latin American Countries: An Overview and 
Comparative Perspective on Framing, in TRANSGENDER POLITICS: GROUPS, ISSUE FRAMING, & POLICY ADOPTION 49, 
63 (Jami K. Taylor & Donald P. Haider-Markel, eds., 2014). 
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in the story of progress that underwrites the liberal world view in the United States: 
a previously disdained social group’s slow but inevitable (from hindsight) triumph 
over an oppression enforced by the state and made possible by widespread social 
animus.34 For example, earlier this year U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch situated 
the rights of trans people firmly within the civil rights tradition when she announced 
a federal civil rights lawsuit challenging a North Carolina law that restricted bathroom 
access in schools and public buildings to the sex classification on one’s birth certifi-
cate: 
This is not the first time that we have seen discriminatory responses to historic mo-
ments of progress for our nation. We saw it in the Jim Crow laws that followed the 
Emancipation Proclamation. We saw it in fierce and widespread resistance to Brown 
v. Board of Education. And we saw it in the proliferation of state bans on same-sex 
unions intended to stifle any hope that gay and lesbian Americans might one day be 
afforded the right to marry . . . . This country was founded on a promise of equal rights 
for all, and we have always managed to move closer to that promise, little by little, one 
day at a time.35 
As the essays in the collection show, the political legibility that identity politics 
provides matters. It has been crucially effective in allowing all sorts of gender non-
conforming people to be represented as a group in the policymaking arena. 
From the universalizing perspective, however, the concern is that the minori-
tizing politics represented in Taylor and Haider-Merkel’s book will only produce 
gains for the people who, if we borrow Sedgewick’s description, “really are” 
transgender, leaving the “garden variety-gender benders” behind. That concern as-
sumes that the political horizon of identity-based groups is limited to their own pa-
rochial interests. But, as Sellers and Rodrick Colvin explain in their essay, the actual 
language in “transgender-inclusive” nondiscrimination legislation is expansive rather 
than narrowly constructed.36 Shannon Minter and I wrote in 2000 that, 
[d]espite the fears of some, the emergence of a transgender rights movement has not 
resulted in laws that protect only a narrowly defined class. . . . Instead, transgender 
advocates and legislators have attempted to fashion statutory language that respects 
both the diversity among transgender people and the commonality between 
transgender people and others. . . .Moreover, the broad definitions used in most of 
                                                          
 34. PAISLEY CURRAH, NOT THE UNITED STATES OF SEX: REGULATING TRANSGENDER IDENTITY (forthcom-
ing). My book ultimately argues, however, that while transgender identity politics has been successful, its rights-based 
agenda dovetails too neatly with neoliberalism’s celebration of diversity and does not advance the needs of trans 
people, who are economically precarious, incarcerated, or made vulnerable by a regime of racial terror.  
 35. U.S. Department of Justice, Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch Delivers Remarks at Press Conference Announcing 
Complaint Against the State of North Carolina, (May 9, 2016), accessed May 24, 2016, https://www.jus-
tice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-loretta-e-lynch-delivers-remarks-press-conference-announcing-complaint. 
 36. The language used in New York City’s Human Rights Law, which I helped draft and which passed in 2002, 
is typical of the expansive approach. It includes both gender identity and gender expression, and covers those who 
conform to gender norms and those who do not: “The term ‘gender’ shall include actual or perceived sex and shall 
also include a person’s gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior or expression, whether or not that gender 
identity, self-image, appearance, behavior or expression is different from that traditionally associated with the legal 
sex assigned to that person at birth.” 
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these statutes also include people who do not identify as transgender, but whose gen-
der identity or expression is at odds with stereotypical norms about gender in some 
way.37 
To be sure, in some jurisdictions, legislators exempted grooming and dress 
codes from the protections these laws offer, mirroring the courts’ reluctance to see 
them as barriers to gender equality. But culpability for the courts’ and legislatures’ 
defense of hegemonic gender norms cannot be assigned to transgender rights move-
ment. These norms do not regulate only transgender people, they are not minoritiz-
ing—and neither should be the politics that seeks to transform them. The thought 
experiment of this review essay was to sever the analysis of particular political strate-
gies from various assumptions about what gender really is. Agreement on the origin 
of gender is not required to challenge the ability of employers and judges to force 
people to adhere to gender norms. What is required is a shared commitment to the 
political value of gender equality. 
In Epistemology of the Closet, Sedgwick reminds her readers several times that the 
impasse between minoritizing and universalizing views is not a contradiction to be 
resolved. She urges her readers not to foreclose either definitional approach, but to 
explore the gaps between them, to understand what each made possible, what each 
made invisible, and to think through the very terms of their incommensurability. 
Writing in a time when the Republican Party’s culture wars were in the ascendency, 
when the Supreme Court had just ruled that criminalizing consensual same-sex sex 
was perfectly consonant with the Constitution, when William F. Buckley Jr. proposed 
tattooing people living with HIV, when the “scourge of AIDS” became a genocidal 
fantasy of the Christian right, Sedgwick asked: “As gay community and the solidarity 
and visibility of gays as a minority population are being consolidated and tempered 
in the forge of this specularized terror and suffering, how can it fail to be all the more 
necessary that the avenues of recognition, desire, and thought between minority po-
tentials and universalizing ones be opened and opened and opened?”38 In the present 
historical moment, as those on the liberal-left spectrum begin to respond to the ter-
rifying reality of the November 2016 election results, we would do well to heed Sedg-
wick’s call. 
                                                          
 37. Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The Struggle to Achieve Judicial and Legislative Equality 
for Transgender People, 7 WM. AND MARY J. WOMEN & L. 37, 57–58 (2000). 
 38. SEDGWICK, supra note 3, at 130. 
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